Why do some communities take up arms against an occupying power while others submit without significant resistance? It is a question of long-standing interest, and several different accounts have circulated among scholars and in the policy world. One set of explanations points to the strategy and behavior of the occupying power. They argue that the provision of services and restraint from excessive or indiscriminate creates a stable, predictable order and wins the “hearts and minds” of the subject population. Others suggest that the propensity of a population to rebel against foreign occupation depends largely on the relative balance of traditional military capabilities, i.e. whether potential rebels in a given region can expect to have supply, manpower, and favorable terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003). A different and more recent literature points to the presence of dense, well-organized networks and prior social ties, such as the patronage networks of a former ruling party, kinship and clan ties, or dense and overlapping bonds among local villagers (Scott 1990, Opp 1993, Gould 1995, Peterson 2001, Peterson 2002, McAdam 1982). Such networks reportedly give certain societies the resources, organizational structure, and motivation to engage in the clandestine activity and self-
sacrifice needed to resist a superior occupying force. The idea that certain historical or cultural traditions may play a role also marks many accounts.\(^2\) Martial traditions, the prior cultivation of patriotism or nationalism among the population, or cultural or religious differences between the occupier and the occupied may make some societies more likely to view an occupying force as illegitimate and/or be more willing to take up arms against it (Wood 2003). Put simply, some “hearts and minds” may simply be harder to win over than others.

The answers to this question are not simply of importance to contemporary policy, and they reflect fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of social mobilization and violence that lie at the center of scholarly debate. In most observational research, however, the relative influence of these different factors is very hard to disentangle. This is certainly true for the responses to US occupation in Iraq: Was the higher level of resistance to US military occupation in Iraq in Anbar province, for example, due to the fact that the population is Sunni, the proximity to supply lines coming from the Syrian border, the dense and long-standing religious networks in the province, the high concentration of former Baathist military officers, or the combination of bouts of indiscriminate violence with limited troop presence that has characterized the US occupation? We may never know. The concentration of all of these factors in the province makes it virtually impossible to parse out which account for the intensity of the resistance. Difficulty distinguishing relevant causal factors is a problem typical of traditional military case studies.

In part to address this problem, scholars in the past decade have generated an impressive and growing quantitative literature on insurgency with the goal of estimating the distinct effects of different factors using statistical methods and a large number of observations. Towards this end, resistance to foreign occupation has been grouped under the broader rubric of “insurgency” and all cases since 1945 have been coded. In many respects the findings of these analyses have highlighted many of the same factors that prove salient in the military case literature: the relative capacity of the occupying state,

\(^2\) A rich account of the role of historical and cultural tradition in the formation of a nationalist resistance movement can be found in Cronin 1980.
the favorability of terrain to insurgent activity, the degree of external support for the insurgents, or the availability of arms and of young men.

But the gains in comparative scope from the analysis of these large post-1945 data sets are potentially outweighed by significant losses in the quality of measurement, over-aggregation of units, and the omission of critical variables that are too difficult to code across many countries and time periods. Aggregation to the country level elides the fact that resistance is typically localized, and means that critical within-country variation gets lost. The use of very distant proxy measures—e.g. using per capita GDP as the measure of the relative strength of the central government or occupying power—often means that it is not clear whether hypotheses are actually being tested and leave us with multiple plausible interpretations of some findings. Moreover, the imperative of collecting annual data on over 100 countries over a sixty year time period means that data about subject societies—such as personal networks, social organization, ideology, or political or ethnic identities not based on the ascriptive categories of language or religion—are simply left out of the analysis since it has not been collected by census or agencies or national statistical offices. Given that we know from case studies that many of these unobserved variables (e.g. strong clan ties) are likely to cluster with the variables that are observed (e.g. mountainous terrain, or low per capita GDP), there is reason to believe that the estimates produced by these analyses are biased; they suffer from the same problems as the traditional military case studies. As a result, although these statistical studies have been useful in highlighting certain general factors associated with the development of an insurgency, these problems of aggregation, measurement, and omission of critical variables present significant limitations.

I adopt an approach which overcomes some of these drawbacks by examining sub-national variation in support for a single insurgency, but using a natural experiment rather than a standard case-study design. The narrow scope of the case study allows for superior measurement, but due to an accident of history that led to the development of nationalism in one province rather than its neighbor, we can better identify the effects of different variables. A highly structured comparison of the success or failure of the

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\[3\] Note the different interpretations of the significance of per capita GDP provided by Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Collier and Hoeffler 2000.
insurgency in neighboring provinces should allow us to better assess the role played by nationalism, personal networks, and other hard-to-measure factors in explaining the propensity of groups to take up arms against an occupying force.

With this purpose in mind, this paper takes us to two provinces in the Carpathian mountains during the 1940s to examine the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiiia, or UPA), the largest and most protracted armed resistance to Soviet rule after the Second World War. Between 1944 and 1952, the UPA fought a war against the Soviet army and interior units (NKVD and MVD) that mobilized over 100,000 combatants. At its height in 1945, the UPA had four territorial divisions (North, South, West, East) under unified command. It ran officer training camps and hospitals and had factories producing food, equipment, and uniforms on Soviet territory well after the end of WWII. Despite the overwhelming superiority in men, arms and material resources on the Soviet side, the skilled and experienced repressive institutions of the Soviet state, and an enormous counter-insurgency campaign, the insurgent movement was sufficiently well-organized and supported to continue well after the end of the Second World War.

By their own accounts, the UPA combatants were motivated by an extreme form of Ukrainian nationalism. The stated war aim of the UPA was to build an ethnically homogenous Ukrainian state or to be killed in the process. This goal was expressed in popular UPA slogans (e.g. "Long live an independent Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans. The Poles beyond the Sian, Germans to Berlin, Jews on meat hooks!" (Litopys UPA 1991, 21, #49))4, and in the regular manifestos, declarations, and platforms published by UPA underground presses (Boshyk 1986, 186-201). We can also see efforts to realize this goal in carefully planned UPA actions. Beginning in March of 1943, prior to taking on the Soviets, UPA units mounted a concerted effort to annihilate the Polish populations of Volhynia and, later, Galicia, culminating in the attacks of July 11 and 12 in which an estimated 12,000 Polish civilians were killed (Snyder 2003, 217-221; Berkhoff 2004, 291; Piotrowski 1998, 245, 381; Armstrong 1955, 151-155). This willingness to kill was almost equally matched by a willingness to die, particularly after the end of the Second World War when the insurgents’ prospects of survival grew

4 Report no. 126 of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service, dated October 29, 1941 citing a letter to the Gestapo in Lviv, signed by the OUN.
remote. In their popular songs, UPA soldiers sing of departing on missions from which they know they will not return, of saying goodbye to those that they love knowing that they will never see them again, of exploding their bunkers at the point of discovery so that they can take the enemy with them – of the glory and sadness of dying for an independent Ukraine.

Not all Ukrainians warmed to the UPA’s extreme nationalism or its anti-Soviet activities. Despite the fact that it fielded a large number of men under arms, the UPA’s primary area of activity was narrowly circumscribed. The main strength of the movement lay in only five provinces: Stanislaviv, Ternopil, Drogobych, Lviv, and Rivne. The territorial limits of the insurgency were not by design. The UPA made an effort to extend the insurgency beyond these five provinces, but its chronicles record considerable difficulty in such attempts due to the lack of support from the local peasants. Given the fact that support for the UPA appears to have a territorial basis, why was the insurgency so successful in some provinces and unable to build support in others? Indeed, the answer to this question will probably tell us not only a great deal about reasons for the success or failure of the UPA and the causes of the anti-Soviet insurgency, but may uncover some general reasons why insurgencies appear in some cases and not in others, and the conditions under which radical ideas induce people to take up arms.

In particular, I focus on a comparison of two neighboring Ukrainian provinces, Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia, which constitute something close to a natural experiment for testing the link between nationalism and insurgency (see Appendix C for maps). At the outbreak of the Second World War, these provinces were virtually identical to one another in most of the ways that scholars have thought could influence the development of an insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The majority of the inhabitants in both regions spoke the same language, a language that we now call Ukrainian. Neither region was industrialized. Both regions were overwhelmingly rural, with the peasants engaged either in forestry or in the farming of small holdings. Agriculture was still unmechanized and livestock was used to turn the soil. The overwhelming majority of the population of both territories lived in small settlements (less than 2000 inhabitants)

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5 Approximately ninety percent of the insurgent attacks took place in Galicia (Stanislaviv, Drogobych, Ternopil, and Lviv) (Armstrong 1963, 296). The UPA’s own records of the insurgency (the 50+ volume “Chronicle of the UPA”) make clear that the largest concentration of forces was in Galicia.
The peasants of both regions were members of the Uniate (or Greek Catholic) Church and the population of most towns was divided evenly between Jews and Roman Catholics. The terrain of both provinces was identical, and ideal for partisan warfare. The roads were of poor quality. The mountains were high enough to limit the use of heavy armor, but low enough to be habitable. Both areas were covered by the same coniferous forest in the mountains, with small farms becoming more prominent as one moved into the more populous foothills and plains.

With respect to participation in the insurgency, however, the two provinces could not have been more different. Stanislaviv province (today’s Ivano-Frankivsk) was the province in which the UPA was most active and active for the longest period of time. The first units were formed in July of 1943 under the rubric of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization (Ukrainska Narodna Samooborona), the predecessor of the UPA in the region. (Litopys UPA 1990, 18, p 19) By the end of 1944, after the front had passed to the West and Soviet forces had retaken the province from German control, there were ten UPA battalions in Stanislaviv province (approximately 10,000 combatants). In 1945, after the war in Europe had come to an end, there were still 4,500 men fighting in 36 UPA companies in Stanislaviv province alone. By the middle of 1946, after aggressive Soviet counterinsurgency operations, the UPA forces in the province were reduced to approximately 2,500. Small units continued to conduct attacks on Soviet installations into the early 1950s.

Just over the mountain passes in Transcarpathia, however, there was no anti-Soviet insurgency. The UPA occasionally mounted raids into Transcarpathia, but they were never able to mobilize even a single indigenous company in the region. (Litopys UPA 1990, 19, p 22). Moreover, documents in the 50-volume “Chronicle of the UPA” record considerable difficulty in the UPA’s efforts to extend the insurgency to the territory or to spark popular resistance to Soviet rule. Hence, even as the Eastern (Northern) slope of the Carpathians was thick with insurgents, villagers on the Western (Southern) slope could not be induced to take up arms. Despite all of their commonalities, the two provinces had markedly different levels of resistance to Soviet occupation. Why?
I find that the answer to this question lies in the fact that a distinct form of Ukrainian nationalism was cultivated among the peasantry of Stanislaviv but not among a virtually identical peasant population on the other side of the Carpathians. It was the prior nationalism cultivated in one of the provinces that led to the activation of local networks, and to the creation of the clandestine nationalist organizational networks that provided the organizational framework for the insurgency. To make this case, I first demonstrate that prior to 1867 these two peasant populations can be seen as fundamentally identical to one another in all relevant respects. Then, drawing on a theory that links the development of an enduring nationalism to the content of initial mass schooling in a province, I detail how, due to the vagaries of internal boundaries within the Austro-Hungarian empire, a Ukrainian identity and national political loyalty among the population of Stanislaviv was crafted during the first round of mass schooling at the end of the 19th century, but not in Transcarpathia. Next, I show that while dense civic and village networks eventually developed in both provinces, only in the Stanislaviv region, where nationalist ideology provided a strong motive to take up arms, did these networks provide the kernels of an insurgency. Finally, drawing on interviews and oral histories of the inhabitants of the two provinces who lived through this period and experienced the insurgency first hand, I provide further evidence for the mechanisms linking the content of schooling to nationalism, nationalism to the formation of underground networks, and the role of nationalist networks in the emergence of armed resistance to occupation.

The Theoretical Link Between Nationalism and Insurgency

Although nationalism tends to come up in many accounts of resistance to occupation, particularly by armed participants and their descendants, it is worth formulating, briefly, the theoretical reasons why nationalism can be seen as a cause of insurgent action. Nationalism can be expected to impact the prospects of insurgency in three ways.6

6 Nationalism is an amalgam of three beliefs about what constitutes legitimate political rule. First, it is a belief in the nation, an imagined impersonal community defined by its common history and perceived distinctiveness. Second, it is a belief that one can only be legitimately ruled by one’s own kind, by a co-national; legitimate authority only accrues to members of the same imagined community. Third, it is a belief that the nation as a whole has an inherent right to exercise sovereignty over a specific territory, and
First, we might expect that “nationalized” areas – areas with a cultivated sense of national identity – that are subordinate to an alien political authority would be more liable to armed resistance. The predominant feature of “nationalized” populations is that they are not indifferent to those who hold political authority and will reject the authority of those perceived to be alien. Because “nationalized” communities are loyal to the state with which they identify, we would expect them to resist rule by other states. The avenues of resistance that are open to the population will depend on many other factors such as terrain, training, and the capabilities of the occupying forces, but we would expect “nationalized” communities to be more resistant to foreign occupation.

Second, nationalism is an ideology that facilitates violent insurgency by reducing the moral or psychological costs of killing and increases an individual’s willingness to engage in self-sacrifice, even death. As a strong identification with a collective entity that is more important than any individual member, nationalism induces a different type of rational calculus: one that justifies self-sacrifice and stigmatizes selfish material motives if they come at the expense of national goals. By strong identification with a collective entity, the individual is more inclined to take action that would be irrational for those whose basis of identification did not extend beyond the self, the family, or other personal bonds. The sacrifice of individual lives for the benefit of the national community as a whole is seen not only as necessary but as honorable – and an individual’s failure to undertake individual sacrifice to preserve the sovereignty of the nation-state is typically seen as traitorous and subject to the most extreme forms of social stigma by the community. Those who identify strongly with a collective entity and for whom an abstract, non-material goal like “national liberation” is a central motivation are likely to be more willing to engage in the hardship, deprivation, and high risk of violent death that insurgency entails – both for the fighters themselves and the people who feed, shelter, and protect them.

Equally important for insurgents, nationalism also provides a moral and socially accepted motivation to kill or commit acts of violence. Because the preservation of the

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7 Identification with the imagined community of the nation changes the meaning of death for the individual soldier; the death of the soldier is intimately connected to the continued life of the community and the nation. Thus, death is not to be feared, but instead is even to be embraced. (Gray 1959).
nation and the nation-state is presented as akin to (collective) survival, violent actions taken in the “defense” of the nation are justified morally as self-defense. Nationalism in this sense is an important motive not only because it is considered by its adherents to be a cause worth dying for, but because its adherents believe that national sovereignty is a cause worth killing for.

Finally, if it is a belief shared within a community, nationalism is not only a source of individual motivation, but acts effectively as a favorable environmental condition. Because insurgents rely on local, usually rural, communities for the fighters, supplies, and information that they need to survive, the political attitudes and loyalties of the local population are critical (Tse-Tung 1961, Richardson 2006, Weinstein 2007). The main strategic advantage of an insurgency that allows it to hold out against the better-armed forces of the state is that the state lacks information about who the insurgents are, where they are hiding, whom they gain their supplies from, and how to navigate the local terrain. All of this information is in the hands of the locals as well as the insurgents, and virtually all of the locals must choose not to provide the state with this information if the insurgency is to be successful. If there are local informants, insurgents and their families are typically located by occupying forces and easily killed or dispersed. Hence, for the insurgent, the community loyalties are a feature of their environment that likely has the greatest impact on their survivability. Nationalism provides the basis for sacrifice and loyalty among complete strangers. This impersonal loyalty, a willingness to aid strangers in a common cause, can be as vital to the success of an insurgency as favorable terrain.

Existing “Revisionist” Accounts: Networks, not Nationalism

Most contemporary analyses have taken a revisionist view of this type of account and treated these nationalist or patriotic motivations as a form of ex post rationalization and glorification rather than explanatory. Virtually all social scientific accounts of an insurgency reject the motives—nationalism, patriotism, or popular rejection of rule by foreigners—often espoused by the participants themselves and glorified in their own

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8 On aggressors’ self-perception as victims and the reduction of “moral costs” associated with killing, see Baumeister 1997, 94, 285-290.
historical accounts and point to structural or natural conditions as the key to explaining violent resistance.

In traditional military case studies, many of which came out of the study of the German occupations of Europe during the Second World War, explanation typically rested on the treatment of the local inhabitants by the occupying power and traditional issues of military supply and manpower (Davies 2000, Ch. 3). An impressive study of the Soviet partisans’ resistance to German occupation suggests, for example, that “popular opposition to the occupation was not decisive in the growth of the partisan movement…A variety of other elements—distance from the front, unsuitable terrain, less social and economic dislocation, absence of large numbers of Red Army men cut off by the German advance—take precedence over nationality in accounting for the [territorial variation in the strength or weakness of the] partisan movement.” (Ziemke 1954, 150).

Similarly, Fearon and Laitin suggest that their extensive analysis of insurgency using cross-national statistical studies points to the fact that “ethnic antagonisms, nationalist sentiments, and grievances” do not play any role in explaining incidences of insurgent violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

A general feature of the revisionist literature on violent rebellion is an aversion towards explaining variation in the propensity to rebel on the basis of ideology. Although there are a variety of critiques, perhaps the most compelling suggests that the motives that lead people to rebel are personal and linked to private networks. In one of the early formulations, Scott cautions not to be misled by rebellions that appear to be based on class, ethnicity or nationalism, pointing out that “ideological principles are often replaced by an identification (positive or negative) with concrete social groups and by political reasoning from the immediate experience of family, job, and friends” (Scott 1979, 98). In a similar vein, recent work by Stathis Kalyvas contends that ideological master frames are typically grafted on to violent movements that have a more localized and more personal etiology (Kalyvas 2006, 44-48). Roger Petersen, in his discussion of why community networks are the focus of his work, rightly notes that “the unit of analysis should not be the ‘nation’ or a ‘people’ because tremendous variation in

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9 This approach is exemplified in the work of Peter Hart (2003) on the Irish war of Independence and subsequent civil war.
rebellion activity exists within these large units” (Peterson 2001). Rather than broad ideology or impersonal ties, Petersen points to specific mechanisms—status considerations, norms of reciprocity, and threshold-based action—that flow from the intimate structure of the community and a “high level of face-to-face contact” to explain the incidence of insurgent mobilization and violence. (Peterson 2001, 16).

This stress on personal bonds and community norms rather than impersonal attachments to abstract ideas or broad social goals is a central theme of the literature on network analyses of rebellion and collective action. Gould predicted that collective action is more likely to occur as networks grow denser, and that actors more central to the network are more likely to mobilize (Gould 1993). Barkley and Van Rossem focus on the importance of “intravillage networks of solidarity and conflict, the ties of villages to other villages, and their position within the regional system” and predict that villages with lower levels of organization will be less likely to mobilize (Barkley and Van Rossem 1997, 1346). Echoing Scott, these authors stress the importance of “daily interaction, such as kinship, friendship, and neighbourhood familiarity.” (Barkley and Van Rossem 1997, 1348). In the words of Useem (1980), the personal ties of a village “furnishes individuals with a communication network, a set of common values and symbols around which members can be mobilized, a tradition of participation in group activity, and an authority structure” (Useem 1980, 357). Petersen, the only scholar to explicitly tie this network literature to explain resistance to occupation, uses a careful analysis of the resistance to occupation in Eastern Europe to argue that the propensity to resist foreign occupation depends largely on how local communities are structured—i.e. whether the pre-existing social networks are strong enough to generate the peer-pressure and norms of self-sacrifice needed to resist superior forces.

All of these authors assume that pre-existing face-to-face networks will solve many of the collective action problems that insurgents face, that personal bonds take precedence over impersonal attachments as the basis for group mobilization, and that motives are typically endogenous to network structure, i.e. the nature of one’s social ties determines their actions and beliefs.
Problems with the Network Arguments

There are three potential problems with revisionist accounts of armed resistance. The first is that because networks are so ubiquitous, the finding may be trivial. Simply tracing how actors mobilized through one set of networks does little to explain the causes of resistance, since some network will always be available. If the implicit null hypothesis is that those who unite in an armed insurgency are friendless and without family or communal bonds, it is not surprising that network explanations outperform. This problem is compounded by a bias of researchers to examine cases of successful mobilization rather than cases where mobilization failed or was never attempted.\(^{10}\)

Second, network membership is not assigned randomly. Individuals may enter into networks because of their prior attachment to a set of beliefs, ideals, or affinities which may serve as the direct cause of their willingness to participate in an insurgency; the putative “network” effects may simply reflect these (unobserved) qualities of network members. The idea that individuals in nationalist fraternities (Petersen’s *Ateitininkai*, for example), civic organizations, and other voluntary associations may have been selected or self-selected based on their ideas or other lurking variables of interest is highly plausible. Without exploring the origins of the network and the principles of membership selection, we may be missing critical attributes that account for the propensity to resist occupation that are independent of personal ties.

Third, even if the network ties are long-standing and structural, it is not necessarily clear how their role is causal. Why do communal bonds that appear to be a source of stability and cohesion at one moment provide the basis for an insurgency at another? The fact that the networks are durable, and a constant over time, is both a strength (exogeneity) and a weakness of the analysis. Density of networks may account for variation across space, but other factors must be included to help explain changes over time or the onset of mobilization.

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\(^{10}\) Petersen’s work is a notable exception in this regard, particularly his comparisons across villages and across provinces (Galicia with Volhynia).
An Empirical Solution

Clear tests of either the nationalist/ideological or the revisionist explanations, whether network-based or otherwise, are few, and these arguments have never been properly tested in a large-n cross-national study using countries as the units of analysis.

Part of the problem is in identifying and measuring nationalism and networks prior to the point of occupation. Kalyvas points out that authors have too often used ascriptive categories incorrectly as a proxy for ideology or nationalism, as is typical of the “ethno-linguistic fractionalization” or ELF index (Kalyvas 2006, 46). Such ascriptive measures simply test the primordialist claim that ethnic identifications and national political loyalties flow naturally from distinct attributes like language, phenotype, or religion, a proposition that most scholars of nationalism would necessarily reject. But taking an approach that examines the self-conception and salience of different attributes to national identity requires a theory of where those sentiments come from and a way to identify how they would be distributed within a population.

To do this, we draw on a theory that argues that fixed and durable national loyalties are instilled in a population during the first round of mass schooling—when a community shifts from an oral to a literate mass culture (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006). According to this argument, national loyalties are internalized by individuals and their families through unique status changes during the shift to literate culture that rupture traditional attachments and produce a powerful affective tie to a “constitutive story” or myth that locates the community as members of a particular historical nation.\(^{11}\) Once initially established through the schools, such national identities are preserved and reproduced over time within families and reinforced by local communities in a way that makes these constructed identities virtually impervious to significant change or elimination over time. Even as material or political incentives change, or as states attempt to assimilate these populations for the purpose of securing their loyalty, schooled populations show a remarkable tenacity in sustaining this initial national identity, history, and loyalties; and they will vote, conceal, kill, or die if need be, to insure that they and those like them are ruled by those they perceive to be their own kind. As a result, if one knows the national content of the initial schooling in a community, one knows the most

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\(^{11}\) On the concept of a constitutive story, see Smith 2003.
basic political loyalties of that community. This gives one remarkable power to predict how that community will align even more than a century hence. Also, because the national identities remain fixed following the initial schooling of the population, we can assume that we know the spatial distribution and content of the national identity prior to the onset of occupation. This allows us to generate clear and testable hypotheses rather than rely simply on ex post accounts of participants.

Assuming that the inclusion of certain types of nationalist content in the initial round of mass schooling is sufficient to generate an enduring form of nationalism, and that nationalist ideas provide a motive for armed resistance to occupation, then we can formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: Ceteris paribus, (and assuming favorable terrain and other facilitating conditions) populations will mount insurgencies against any sovereign power other than the national government with which their community was taught to identify with in the first round of mass schooling.

A Natural Experiment: The Provinces of Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia

To assess whether prior schooling and nationalism are playing such a causal role in the resistance to occupation, one would ideally wish to identify two occupied territories that were identical to one another but for the fact that nationalism had been cultivated in one but not in the other and examine the similarities or differences in the response to the occupying power. Such “natural experiments” never occur in pure form, but there are certain regions that, in rare historical instances, allow us a rough approximation of these conditions. I suggest that the conditions in the Carpathian mountains during the 1940s come close enough to these conditions to warrant detailed examination. The neighboring provinces of Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia received different schooling treatments merely because they fell on different sides of an internal boundary of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1867. The arbitrary way that the East Slavic peasant population was divided—and the high degree of homogeneity in other respects—allows us to identify the long-term effect of the national identity created through school content. (For justification of this proposition, see Appendix A.) If
schooling plays such a critical role, then the differences critical to an explanation of the post-Soviet insurgency were created in the period between 1867 and 1914, when East Slavic (rusyn) peasant communities in Galicia were subject to an intensive Ukrainian nationalization process, while a highly similar group of East Slavs (rusyns) in Transcarpathia were not. This treatment then shaped nationalist organizations that became the basis for the insurgency. As shown below, the nationalist networks were important to the development of the insurgency in Stanislaviv, but they are endogenous to the ideological preconditions that differentiated the two provinces.

The Ausgleich of 1867: Separation into Treatment and Control and the Cultivation of Different National Loyalties

The argument rests on the differences in how the two provinces were schooled; this is the relevant “treatment” in the experimental design. With regard to the content of schooling, the point at which the political identities of the East Slavs on the two sides of the Carpathians began to diverge is the Ausgleich of 1867. In the concessions made to the Hungarians after the defeat of the Habsburgs by Prussia in 1866, the empire was divided into a “dual monarchy”, Austria and Hungary, and the Hungarians were given exclusive control over the internal affairs of their traditional crownlands. At this point, all areas to the West (South) of the Carpathian divide were under Hungarian control. As Vienna’s domination came to an end. The few Russian-language schools, publications, and rusyn cultural institutions were closed.

The rusyn areas West (South) of the Carpathian divide were subject to a series of incomplete schooling efforts. The Hungarian government did not attempt to educate the majority of the rural population, and Magyarized the relatively small elite that it educated. Literacy among the rusyn (largely peasant) population of Maramaros, Ung, and Bereg provinces was approximately 20% by the outbreak of World War I. Data from 1906 show no rusyn-language schools in Hungary and only 34 Rusyn-Magyar bilingual

12 This abruptly ended all support for Russification, which had been promoted by Vienna following the revolutionary developments of 1846-48 as part of a strategy of “divide and rule.” As pointed out by Magocsi, “the Rusyn national revival was linked to the Habsburg effort to suppress the Hungarian revolution. Therefore, it could survive only as long as Vienna dominated the political life of Hungary.” (Magocsi 1993, 46).
The limited education offered to the population was oriented towards their assimilation into Magyar, but for the most part the peasantry remained as it had been. The territories to the West (South) of the Carpathian divide and under Hungarian control were inculcated in a Magyare r national story focusing on the peoples united by the Crown of St. Stephen, and the small percentage of the population educated during that time assimilated to become Hungarians (Magocsi 1978).

In Austrian Galicia, by contrast, the negative example of the Hungarians led the Habsburgs to redouble their efforts with the Poles. On the one hand this meant making concessions to the Polish elite, giving them greater autonomy over the province of Galicia. At the same time, Vienna retained control over the school system and the Greek Catholic Church and continued to build a counter-weight to Polish influence in the province.

In addition to continued efforts to cultivate a challenge to the Poles, the Austrians began to turn the population against Russia as Vienna began to grow concerned about Russian expansionism. The Russian empire had begun to extend its rail network, was beginning to experience rapid economic growth and increased military capability, and during negotiations with France prior to the Franco-Austrian war of 1859, the Russian government had proposed to annex Galicia and create an independent Hungary. (Blumberg 1954, 158) Moreover, given the Rusyn revival supported by Vienna for the previous two decades, the few East Slavic speaking peasants of Galicia who could read, most considered themselves to be Russian, and Russophile sentiments dominated the intellectual culture of the literate rusyns. There were several Russian-language newspapers in the region that advocated identification of the local peasantry with the Tsarist Empire (i.e. as Russians), and the Tsarist Empire had also developed a pan-Slavic ideology that would legitimate its dominion over the Slavic world. At a time when

According to Magocsi 1978, 66, “While most of the subcarpathian intelligentsia became Magyarized, the mass of the population remained unaffected.”

Russian “irredentism” was a major concern of the Austrian authorities in the latter half of the 19th Century. (Magocsi 2002, 79; Himka 1980, 125-138; Smolka 1916).

Himka notes that Russophilism, holding that the rusyny of Galicia were part of one large Russian nation that included the Great, White, and Little Russians and supporting a pro-tsarist political orientation, “was the strongest trend among Ukrainians in Galicia until the political trial of 1882, when it began a rapid decline in popularity.” (Himka, 1988, p.66 (fn59)).

Himka notes that the Russophile newspaper, Słowo, had the highest circulation of the rusyn newspapers in the region. (Himka, 1988, 66).
language and nationality were becoming the basis for territorial sovereignty, there was justifiable concern in Vienna that the Russian government might challenge their control over the Slavic regions under Habsburg domain.

The Austrian leadership had several responses to these challenges – and these responses constitute the distinct treatment that differentiates Galicia (and Stanislaviv) from the Western slope of the Carpathians (Transcarpathia). One strategy was to respond directly to undercut the rival elites. To break the ties to the Russian Empire the government cracked down on the Russophile movements that dominated the thinking of literate rusyns in the region in the 1860s and 70s. (Wilson 1997, 34-35; Himka 1988, 66; Himka 1999, 87, 140, 165). In 1882, several Russophile Greek Catholic priests were prosecuted on charges of high treason. The government also repressed Russophile publications and purged the Church hierarchy of Russian Orthodox sympathizers. (Himka 1999). In this way, the Austrian authorities employed repressive means to prune away potentially dangerous, and hitherto dominant, Russophile elements.

The government in Vienna also put forward its own story about the East Slavic population of Galicia: it mobilized a new “Ukrainian” identity among the East Slavic peasants as a way of excluding rival claims to authority over Galicia. It is at this time, the late 1800s, that the ethronym “Ukrainian” – as opposed to rusyn, ruthenian, ruskij, rusnak or malorusskij – first appears in widespread popular usage in Austrian territory. A “Ukrainian” grammar and standard written language, stripped of Russisms, was constructed out of a mix of the writings of the Kharkiv romantics, the poetry of Taras Shevchenko, and local Galician dialects and adopted as the literary standard (Kozik, 1986 p. 301-306; Wilson 1997, 28-31)\(^\text{17}\). As part of a political bargain between the Austrian government in Vienna, the local Polish elite, and local Ukrainophile leaders, a Chair of history was created at the University of Lemberg (Lviv) in 1889 for the study of Ukrainian history.\(^\text{18}\) Its first occupant was Mihailo Hrushevsky, who wrote the first history of Ukraine – an articulation of the constitutive story that would provide the format for all subsequent national histories, and which was immediately incorporated into the

\(^{17}\) Linguistic construction and the purging of Russisms was again undertaken by the Soviets, see Wexler 1974, 113-114, 159, 239.

\(^{18}\) TK
history texts used in the new primary and secondary schools.19 Although these measures were not exclusively a pre-conceived policy in Vienna,20 the fact that the first widespread use of the term “Ukrainian” is found in Austrian territory, that “Ukrainian” history was first legitimated in Austrian state universities and propagated in Austrian state schools, and coincided with the state’s use of coercion against Russophile movements suggest the outlines of a coherent strategy to cultivate a new “Ukrainian” national identity among the rusyns as a way of inoculating the peasant population of Galicia against the rival Polish and Russian appeals.21

The strategic role of the new nationalist ideas is reflected in the content of the constitutive story instilled in the rusyn populations under Austrian control. The Austro-Ukrainian story performed three tasks. It established the rusyns as members of a Ukrainian nation that was racially and linguistically distinct from the Russians and the Poles, with a national homeland that stretched from the Carpathian mountains East to the Caucasus, and from the Black Sea north to the Pripyat marshes22; it provided an ancient and distinguished pedigree for the nation by projecting Ukrainian statehood deep into the past and establishing it as one of the oldest nations in Europe; and it established the Poles and the Russians as the historical enemies of the Ukrainians, who had conspired to subjugate and eradicate the Ukrainian nation to the point where its existence was virtually unknown even among its own people.23

19 Hrushevsky wrote several popular histories of Ukraine, including a widely-circulated Illustrated History of Ukraine, written in Ukrainian and first published in 1891 (1901). His 10-volume Istorii Ukrainy-Rus (History of Ukraine-Rus) was published between 1898 and 1937.
20 Although see Magocsi 1996; Wilson 1997, 34-35.
21 See also Kozik 1986, 325. In the mid 1800s, the first “Ukrainophile” movement within the Russian Empire was given support by the Tsarist authorities to undercut Polish claims to the Southwestern region of the Empire. This movement never extended beyond a small academic circle.
22 The territorial claims made on behalf of this newly-construed nation were enormous. Maps were printed in schoolbooks which defined the homeland or ethno-linguistic territory of the Ukrainian race as a broad expanse extending far to the East beyond the confines of Austrian Galicia and incorporating the core grain-growing and industrial regions of the Russian Empire. (Kubijovich and Kulits’kij. 1937, Ch.1; Rudnyckyj 1914.)
23 Hrushevsky’s history is particularly favorable to the Austrian regime: “The placing of Galicia under Austrian rule was the beginning of the Ukrainian renaissance in western Ukraine. But in the Ukrainian provinces which were taken away from Poland by Russia, the lot of the Ukrainians was not improved, but, on the contrary, the powerful hand of the new Russian administration placed a strength behind the rule of the polish nobles over the Ukrainian serfs such as they had never known under the weak and decentralized government of Poland.” (Hrushevsky,1941 p. 468.) Hrushevsky’s history is filled with abuses and atrocities committed by both Russians and Poles against “Ukraine”. It is particularly hostile to the Russians. For example, speaking of the construction of the Pechersk fortress, he writes: “Meanwhile the
The constitutive story also projected the nation into the past. The uncomfortable recent vintage of the Ukrainian language was glossed over by the appropriation of the chronicles of Kievan Rus as early examples of the Ukrainian language (Old Ukrainian). It could then be argued that “the Ukrainian written language [had] a history of fully [a] thousand years behind it.” (Rudnitsky 1914, 17). Kievan Rus was identified as the first historical Ukrainian state, and its founders were presented as Ukrainians whose descendants brought Christianity to the rest of the Slavs.

In sum, the notion of an ancient and distinct Ukrainian nation, with its own racial, linguistic, and historical heritage was brought together in a new constitutive story in the late 19th Century in Galicia, and therefore only in Stanislaviv and not Transcarpathia.

In contrast to previous movements that were oriented primarily towards the elite, the Austrian authorities used schools and education to cultivate the new national loyalties among the peasantry. Universal primary education was mandated by law in the Austrian Empire in 1867. In 1868, the Austrian government funded the Prosvita reading society, growing it from a minor student organization in Lviv (Lemberg) into a massive network of reading houses with Ukrainian nationalist literature in villages throughout Eastern Galicia and large “national houses” in major cities. The rusyn peasantry was rapidly incorporated into this culture as schools expanded in Galicia at the end of the 19th Century. Significantly, mass education only began in earnest after Russophile elements were purged. In 1886, only 380,000 children out of 709,000 of mandatory age were actually attending school in Galicia (Himka 1988, 60). This was remedied by the founding of 1,444 new schools between 1905 and 1914 in Galicia (as compared to only 2,080 from 1868-1904), half of which used Ukrainian as the language.

tsar’s troops roamed about the country, their officers abusing the inhabitants, taking supplies without compensation, and lording it over all Ukrainians alike, whether common people or officers” and describes Russians cutting off people’s ears, beating them with clubs, raping their wives and daughters, etc. See Hrushevsky, 1941, 359-361, as well as Von Hagen, 1995.

24 According to current Western scholarship, the Kievan Chronicles were written in “Church Slavic in its East Slavic recension.” Any identification of this language as Old Russian, Old Ukrainian, or Old Belorussian is anachronistic given that these writings predate the divergence of East Slavic into different dialectal varieties. See Schenker, 1995, 74.

25 The founders of Kievan Rus were in fact Varangians, a non-Slavic warrior band originating in Scandinavia (Vikings) who linguistically assimilated to the slavs they subjugated. (Schenker 1996, 60.)
of instruction (Himka 1988, 62). The percentage of school age children attending school rose from 15.4% in 1855 to 71.0% in 1900, and approached full attendance by 1914 along with the rapid increase in the number of schools. (Himka 1988, 64) Corresponding increases in literacy were registered over the same period. In Galicia as a whole in 1880, only 17.3% of men and 10.3% of women could read and write. By 1900, literacy rates for the population as a whole were up to 44% (Sirka 1980, 79). By 1910, 59% of people over the age of nine were fully literate (Himka 1980, 60). Ukrainian-language newspapers grew in number, circulation, and frequency throughout the period leading up to WWI, and private reading societies expanded their membership. In this process the spread of literacy and the formation of a (regionally limited) national culture went hand in hand, and it was the educated priests, teachers, and cantors who provided the leadership in both spheres, and local cadres in the national movement were expanded by the literate peasantry as education was extended to the countryside (Himka 1980, 113).

Because of the Ausgleich in 1867, only Galician villagers, including the population of Stanislaviv, received this treatment: The spread of education and the development of this distinct anti-Russian “Ukrainian” identity did not extend to the Rusyns who lived beyond the boundaries of the province (Magocsi 1975). And when Ukrainian nationalists made their way across the border to proselytize among the rusyns of Hungary, their message was not well-received. The peasant rusyn population in Hungary was indifferent to or ignorant of these broader identity categories and the Russophile – and Russian or Rusyn-identified – elite categorically rejected the ideas of the Ukrainians. In the words of one writer: “On this side of the Carpathians there is not one educated Russian (russkij) person who could be fascinated by your independent script [the new Ukrainian phonetic alphabet] and independentist dreams…Between us there cannot be any cooperation, so leave me in peace” (Magocsi 1993, 51). Both populations remained rural, agricultural, and Uniate, but only the newly-educated

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26 Ukrainians/Ruthenians made up only 40% of the population of Galicia. 40% were Poles. 10% were Jews and the rest were predominantly German.

27 All-Austrian percentages at the time were respectively 61.9 and 55.3%. Statistics from Rocznik Statystyki Galicyi, 3 (1889-91):1-2. Cited in Himka, 1988, 60-61.

28 In the mid-19th century Ukrainian activists developed a simplified grammar, literature and a network of reading societies, prosvita (1868), in an effort to expand literacy in the region (Himka, 1980, 113).
Galician peasants were effectively nationalized as Ukrainians prior to World War I and voted overwhelmingly for Ukrainian national parties in the Austrian elections of 1904 and 1912.

After the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the marked difference in the identification of the East Slavic inhabitants on either side of the Carpathian divide remained intact even as the two regions came under the control of different sovereign states. Transcarpathia became an autonomous province, “Subcarpathian Rus”, of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The rusyns (now Ukrainians) of Eastern Galicia initially declared their independence, forming the Western Ukrainian National Republic (ZUNR), but were forcibly incorporated into the interwar Republic of Poland after their defeat by the Polish army.

The Rusyns under Czechoslovak rule never developed a Ukrainian or anti-Russian nationalist identification in large numbers. When the region became part of Czechoslovakia in 1920, the government in Prague invested substantial resources to improve (and de-Magyarize) education in the province, but they made only a limited effort to control the content of the education other than to release the Magyar teachers. From 1920-1938, although textbooks had to be approved by the Ministry of Education, curriculum decisions were left up to individual teachers, many of whom were “immigrants” – Russian White Army officers who settled in the region after the Civil War, and a mix of Russophile and Ukranophile émigrés from (now Polish) Galicia. According to Czechoslovakian statistics, the region achieved mass literacy in these years (the literacy rate rose from 22% prior to WWI to 58% by 1931), but the nature of that educational experience varied widely across districts and over time (Magocsi 1978, 15). No coherent nationality policy was adopted for the schools and the Ukrainian movement – driven by émigrés from Galicia – was in the minority, particularly in the most populous areas of Mukachevo and Uzhgorod. The most prevalent doctrine among Rusyn teachers remained Russophilism, the notion that the inhabitants of the territory were part of a greater Russian nation that included all of the East Slavs.29 Towards this end, a geography textbook approved by the ministry of education and which went through multiple editions and print runs suggesting widespread use, stated that the population of

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29 This is carefully documented in Magocsi 1978.
Transcarpathia as well as the dominant population of the USSR was “rusyn.”

When the Hungarians were awarded the province in 1939 during the partition of Czechoslovakia, they closed 338 of the 768 elementary schools. Of the 430 that remained, 320 had instruction exclusively in Magyar. But by 1939 the majority of the population had already been schooled to identify with a national identity (rusyn) that they considered to be the dominant one in the Soviet Union.

From Nationalisms to Networks: Civil Society, Village Ties, and Network Density

Given the central role attributed to networks in much of the recent theorizing on insurgency, and given that schools can also lead to the construction of new network ties. Indeed, in both Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv, dense social ties developed during the interwar period and civic organizations played a central role in village life.

The typical center of rural life outside of the Church was the chitalna, a “reading room” or “reading house.” These “rooms” were typically small cultural houses that simultaneously served as regular meeting places for theatrical groups, choral groups, scout meetings, and other regular civic activities as well as ad hoc gatherings. Each would typically have a library that was stocked with books and pamphlets supplied by a

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30 In the geography textbooks approved for schools in Subcarpathian Rus in the 1920s, the population of both the region and of the Soviet Union is described as rusyn. For example, in the approved text for schools in Subcarpathian Rus for 1923, which went into several later additions, the Soviet Union is described as “the largest state in Europe” (p. 53) and states explicitly that “the inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. are Rusyns, as divided into three great tribes: Russians, that is Great Russians; Ukrainians or Little Rusyns (Malorusyny) and White Rusyns (Belorusyny).” In other words, the Soviet Union was presented as the largest homeland of the rusyn people. Subcarpathian Rus (Transcarpathia) is referred to as a native region (rodnoi krai), but it is quite clear that the inhabitants are part of a larger nation that includes all East Slavs…all of the peoples of Rus. The text went through at least three editions: 1923, 1926, and 1928 and was the text used in the schools for third grade classes during the expansion of the school system in Carpathian Czechoslovakia. Another popular school textbook (Kondratovych 1924), written by a prominent historian of Transcarpathia in interwar period, stressed that the fate of the People of Transcarpathia “was intertwined with that of the Magyar and Galician rusyns”, but argued that Subcarpathian rusyns have common Slavic origins, but were distinct people with own history (Mysanych 1993, 16)

31 The incorporation of the territory into the USSR brought the region up to full literacy with a curriculum identical to that in the rest of Soviet Ukraine. As noted by Magocsi 1978, 177: “Between the years 1919 and 1944 there was never a single nationality policy established and implemented over a longer term by the educational administrations of the governments that ruled subcarpathian rus [Transcarpathia]. The Czechoslovak government allowed the Russophile, Ukrainophile, and Rusynophile orientations to be propagated…while the Hungarians favored a Rusynophile and tolerated a Russophile trend. The result was what one might expect. In the absence of any consistent educational policy concerning national orientation, there developed three generations of conscious and sometimes intolerant Subcarpathian Russians, Ukrainians, and Rusyns, with a few Czechoslovaks and Hungarians thrown in for good measure.

Subcarpathian society had to wait until 1945, this time under a Soviet regime, before any clearly defined nationality policy would be introduced in the schools.”

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subscription from the publishing house associated with a national organization, which in many cases would also have owned the property. In this respect, such houses and the broader organizations of which they were a part were the hub of many interpersonal village networks, but also united by a broader national organization.

This combination of dense interactions and strong communal bonds within the village with a broader network that spanned villages would be the ideal network structure to serve as the base of an insurgency. It is logical to think that these types of civic networks and the experience of participation in voluntary organizations might have provided the basis for insurgent mobilization and violence, and Petersen has made this claim for the Baltic states and Ukrainian Galicia. As pointed out by Petersen, communal civic organizations were strong in Galicia and the Baltics, yet in the neighboring Ukrainian region of Volhynia such organizations had only a fleeting period of operation before they were banned by the Polish government in 1930 (Peterson 2001, 212-217). Consistent with the broader network literature and drawing on unpublished work by Motyl, Petersen suggests that a higher density of rural organization may explain why the anti-Soviet insurgency that emerged in Galicia and the Baltics in the wake of WWII was so much more resilient than the one in Volhynia.

There is no question that civic organizational networks were very dense in Galicia and that those who joined in the insurgency had also joined in civic networks in peacetime. The dominant organization was Prosvita (literally “enlightenment”), an organization centered in Lviv but with affiliates in most major towns. Prosvita controlled virtually all of the cultural houses and after recovering from the loss of government support following WWI was a substantial operation until 1930 when it was officially banned by the Polish government as part of the general crackdown on Ukrainian nationalism. Prosvita was also tied directly to Plast, the Ukrainian national scouting organization, which gave the kind of training and skills that would be useful as part of military training. Like the German scouting organizations of the 19th century, Plast was linked to the cultivation of militarism in the Ukrainian youth. Moreover, memoirs and interviews with those who participated in the insurgency suggest that their experiences in these Ukrainian cultural organizations were salient for them in their village life. The top commander of the UPA, Roman Shukhevych, had been a Plast scout in his youth.
But these civic networks were equally dense in Transcarpathia among those populations that did not participate in the anti-Soviet insurgency. As a semi-autonomous province in interwar Czechoslovakia, civic organizations were promoted and flourished in Transcarpathia (Magocsi 1978, 156-157). In the interwar period, there were two broad civic organizations that competed with one another for members and for control of the village reading houses. One of these was, as in Galicia, also called Prosvita, but was an independent organization centered in Uzhgorod and founded in 1920. The other was the Dukhnovych society, founded by Russophiles in 1923 as a response to the perceived “Ukrainian” orientation of Prosvita.\(^{32}\) Dukhnovych became the lead organization in the province in terms of both membership and the number of reading houses under its control, but both groups controlled substantial networks. With the exception of Rakhiv, Tiachiv, Volove and Berehovo, the Dukhnovych houses outnumbered Prosvita in each of the school districts of Transcarpathia in 1929 (Magocsi 1978, 357). Dukhnovych society reading rooms outnumbered Prosvita by 202 to 86 in Transcarpathia as a whole. By the latest pre-war statistics, in 1937, the Dukhnovych society had 21,000 members and Prosvita 15,000 (Magocsi 1978, 160). As in Galicia, scouting groups were also prevalent. A branch of Plast was formed for Transcarpathia in 1921 by émigrés from Galicia.\(^{33}\) Plast moved its official center to Transcarpathia in 1930 after the organization was banned in Poland, and the Russian Scouts, linked to the Dukhnovych society, were a Russophile version of Plast.

How do Transcarpathia and Ivano-Frankivsk (a province within Galicia) compare to one another in terms of the density and structure of these personal and civic networks? It is notoriously difficult to measure the density and structure of networks in a population. As a best effort, and given that separate data on scouting organizations is not available for

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\(^{32}\) The official name of the Dukhnovych society was the “Russkoe Kul’turo-Proisvietitel’noe Obshchestvo imeni Aleksandra Dukhnovicha”. It was explicitly anti-Ukrainian, as reflected in the statement made at its founding: “In the course of its one-thousand-year history, our people always called themselves Russian. They always considered their language, their lineage, their customs, their church, and other institutions as Russian.” (Magocsi 1978, 158 quotation in original).

\(^{33}\) And shared the militarism and nationalism of the organization in Galicia. In the words of the founder: “To love the fatherland, its customs, traditions and language, to learn how to help and show the way to his nation so that it can become great and powerful, to defend the nation with tenacity and character from any harm, to raise the culture of the homeland—these are the primary and basic tasks of the Plast scout.” (Magocsi 1978, p.161)
Galicia\textsuperscript{34}, I have collected data on the number of reading houses and membership in the broader cultural enlightenment societies for each of the two provinces. Given the central role of these cultural houses in rural life, it is likely that they are a reliable proxy for general network density. They should also be relatively comparable, since for both Transcarpathian organization and Galicia, a chitalna could be established with a minimum of 10 members. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

The data in the table suggests that despite the fact that these rural civic organizations developed earlier in most parts of Galicia than in Transcarpathia, by the onset of World War II the two provinces were comparable both in the density of organizations and the size of popular membership, although the data on the latter is somewhat suspect.\textsuperscript{35} These data are also consistent with the view that 80-85\% of settlements had a chitalna,\textsuperscript{36} as there was one for about every 1300-1500 inhabitants.

As a result, it is reasonable to assume that most men of fighting age in both Transcarpathia and Ivano-Frankivsk spent their youth in a rural society with strong communal ties, both to the church and to civic organizations, and that they had prior experience in well-organized cultural associations that spanned their localities. In both Transcarpathia and Galicia, villagers danced and sang in choirs together, read the same texts in common libraries, joined in scouting organizations, staged and watched local theater, and were generally strongly tied. Strong, networked communities are a constant across both provinces.

Where the two provinces differed considerably was in the content of the nationalism that was carried in these networks and pre-dated the formation of the networks. In Galicia, which included the province of Stanislaviv, the “culture” of the networks was an anti-Russian and anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalism. Indeed, the region

\textsuperscript{34} There were 3000 Plast scouts in 1935. (Magocsi 1978, p.161)
\textsuperscript{35} In the case of Galician Prosventa, the year-on-year fluctuations in membership are too large to be plausible. The organizational documents suggest that the organization jumped in membership from approximately 15,000 in 1930, the year it was banned, to 319,450 in 1935. During this same period the number of reading houses increased only from 2630 to 3208. For figures, see Vseukrains’ke Tovaristvo 1998, 73.
\textsuperscript{36} Encyclopedia of Ukraine.
provided the nucleus for the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, formed in 1929, which ultimately provided the organizational basis for the anti-Soviet insurgency. The OUN was a clear case of nationalist self-selection and endogenous network formation. The organization was clandestine, triadic in structure, and typically selected its members from the pool of Ukrainian nationalist students (often by the teachers themselves). It conducted incendiary attacks on Polish landholdings, acts of sabotage, and over 60 assassinations – including an assassination of the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs Bronisław Pieracki in 1934 and Soviet consular official A. Mailov. Moreover, the Ukrainians of Galicia, in contrast to other East Slavs under Polish control (such as Ukrainians in Volhynia or Belorussians in the provinces of Vilnius, Białystok, Grodno, and Brest), consistently voted for nationalist parties (Wittenberg and Kopstein 2003).

Similarly, in Transcarpathia the networks appeared to grow out of the culture of the schools. The prevalence of the Dukhnovych society and the more moderate quality of Prosvita in Transcarpathia reflected the general Russophile orientation of the province. The particular culture of a given area depended on the ideology of the teachers within the district, but, on the whole, the region favored the same Russophile myths that served as the foundation of Soviet nationalities policies after 1933. Its inhabitants voted primarily for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia during the Interwar years, which advocated that Subcarpathian Rus be joined with the USSR. There were no ethnic “Ukrainian” or “Rusyn” parties that garnered significant support.

Significantly, the comparison of these two cases allows us to separate out literacy and nationalist school content from other variables associated with “modernization” or even education more generally. Both Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv were overwhelmingly rural at the outbreak of the war. In the last pre-war census, 83.1% of the rusyn population was working in agriculture and forestry (Magocsi 1978, 355). They had schooling without urbanization or industry. Moreover, neither territory had been under extended Russian or Soviet control since the collapse of Kievan Rus. Both territories had been part of the Habsburg empire for well over a century prior to World War I. The two provinces differed markedly in the identity content that was introduced
with the onset of mass schooling, but were remarkably similar in other respects, as shown in Table 2.

[Table 2 here]

_Potential Complications: The Soviet Occupation of Galicia in 1939_

Unfortunately, these two cases do not allow us to control for all variables, and there are also some differences between the two provinces which may be important to explaining the differences in support for the nationalist insurgency. Among these differences is the fact that Stanislaviv, along with the rest of Western Poland, was occupied by the Soviet Union on September 17, 1939. Transcarpathia, after a brief period of autonomy beginning on October 11, 1938, was annexed and occupied by Hungary in March of 1939. In Transcarpathia, the Hungarian government closed the Prosvita society, eliminated all Ukrainian-language publications, and cracked down on the Ukrainian nationalist elites that had come over from Galicia during the brief period of autonomy (Magocsi 1978, 248). The Soviets also eliminated Prosvita and other Ukrainian cultural and economic cooperatives that had been in place, in many cases, since Austrian times. In 1940, the Soviets also began to collectivize agriculture, which met with widespread resistance. Moreover, in part as a response to resistance among the peasants, the latter part of the occupation was marked by massive deportations, repression, and restrictions on the church. On the face of it, it is certainly plausible that the 21-month long Soviet occupation of Galicia could have made the population of these territories more eager to take up arms against the USSR. Unlike the Transcarpathian peasants, the Galician peasants had experienced Soviet repression firsthand.

Although one cannot rule out this explanation using the data on Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv, there is reason to question it. At the very least, we can be sure that Soviet occupation in 1939, on its own, was not sufficient to induce populations to take up arms against the Soviet Union during or after the war. The western parts of Belarus were

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37 For the fullest account of the shifting control over Transcarpathia in this period, see Magocsi 1978, 237-249.
38 They also experienced some of the same “positive” Soviet developments that seemingly appealed to Transcarpathian rusyns after the war: The Soviets changed the official language from Polish to Ukrainian, improved the school system, Ukrainianized the universities, improved health care and expropriated the holdings of Polish landlords and promised to redistribute the land among the peasants.
also part of Poland, and also subject to Soviet occupation\textsuperscript{39}, but no equivalent anti-Soviet insurgency emerged on Belorussian territory – even in the densely forested and marshy terrain in the Southwest. Moreover, even if Transcarpathia did not experience Soviet occupation practices in the period from 1939-1941, it began to experience them immediately after the Red Army secured the territory in 1944. Collectivization, repression of the church, and deportation of “class enemies” were all imposed on Transcarpathia just as the UPA was at its peak strength across the mountains, but the Transcarpathian population still did not support the insurgency. Unfortunately, there are no territories that both had the Ukrainian schooling treatment as part of Austrian Galicia yet did not fall under Soviet occupation. As a result, we cannot identify what would have transpired in the absence of Soviet occupation.

\textit{Individual Histories and Demonstration of Mechanisms}

To assess the role that a particular form of Ukrainian nationalism played in the anti-Soviet insurgency, it is not enough simply to identify the simple correlation between insurgency and nationalism in the two provinces. Despite the fact that the quasi-experimental research design controls for many variables of interest, we need to see the mechanisms at work in the cases. We would like to know precisely whether and how the link between schooling and nationalism were borne out in the lives, motivations, and actions of the insurgent groups and the surrounding villages.

To identify the mechanisms through which nationalism might have influenced the insurgency, we need to ascertain three sets of factors. First we want to identify who fought. In particular, we want to assess the organizing principle of the insurgent groups, particularly the extent to which the ties within the insurgent organization were personal or impersonal. Did the insurgents know one another? What, if any, relationship existed between the combatants prior to the onset of the insurgency and how did this influence its capacity to mobilize? Second, we hope to assess why they fought. We want to identify the stated motivations of both participants and non-participants in the insurgency. To what extent were the motivations of the combatants informed by nationalist ideology, if these motivations predate the insurgency, where did they come from? Did the cultural

\textsuperscript{39} For detailed discussion see Jan Gross 2002.
institutions that we have identified as distinctive to Galicia play any role in the villages? In what ways, if any, did they influence the political or national orientation of the peasants? Third, we want to assess the relationship of the insurgent organization to the villages in the area that it operated. Did they know the people who harbored them? To what extent did they enjoy the loyalty and material and informational support of the villages? To what extent was this based on personal ties between combatants and their home villages or impersonal loyalties to “our boys” simply on the grounds of common national or political identification.

In an effort to provide answers to these questions, I conducted field interviews with respondents in Lvov (Lvov oblast), Kolomea (Stanislaviv Oblast), Kosmach (Stanislaviv Oblast), and Rakhiv (Transcarpathia Oblast). Two of these interviews were with former UPA commanders, Miroslav Simchich and Ivan Fediuk, who were selected because of their special knowledge. The remainder of the respondents (at least those with relevance to this question) were villagers who had lived through the period and were willing to talk about it. Several of these respondents, particularly at the Stanislaviv sites, were also directly involved with the insurgency. Again, I was focused on the motives of the participants, the organization and membership of the units, and the relations between the insurgents and the villages.

Motives

The personal histories and self-reported motivations of the respondents are consistent with the view that their Ukrainian nationalism was a powerful motivating factor in their participation. All who participated claim that they fought for an independent Ukraine, a cause for which they claimed they had been willing to die. Respondents commented that they and others were motivated by an irrepressible “national spirit” and that the Ukrainian spirit had sustained the nation for over 350 years without a state.

When asked about the origins of their own patriotic sentiments, respondents typically referred to their parents. Family appears to have been the most powerful socializing institution. Simchich claimed that his mother was a strong Ukrainian nationalist and that his uncle (his mother’s brother) was a member of a Hutzul military
unit in the First World War. He recalled playing as a child on the kitchen floor while his mother, who was educated in a Ukrainian-language Austrian school, taught him nationalist songs and poems and told him stories from Ukrainian history. In his childhood home, there were pictures of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko on the wall (this was true for many respondents). Neither he nor other respondents on the Stanislaviv side of the Carpathians could recall ever having thought of himself as anything but a Ukrainian.

In several cases, the respondents were members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists before the formation of the UPA. Simchich had attended a private Ukrainian school in his village, where he had been tapped by one of his teachers to join the underground youth organization of the OUN. He then went on to study at the Ukrainian gymnasium in the nearby town of Kolomea (the first Ukrainian gymnasium, founded by the Austrian government in 1848), where he was selected by his history teacher to become a full member in 1940. As a member of a three-person cell, he had no broader knowledge of the movement, but was told to join the UPA in 1943 when the group was first formed to counter Soviet partisan incursions. After training in the mountains (with very few weapons), he fought with the Chorni Chorty battalion (Black Devils) commanded by Lypey between 1943 and 1944, at which point he was sent to an officer training school run by the UPA in Kosmach, where he was trained by a Georgian officer.

Ivan Fediuk, the commander of the political branch of the UPA for the Hoverla region, had a similar past. He also described his mother as a strong Ukrainian patriot and his father had fought in a special Ukrainian unit of the Austrian army during World War I and lost a leg. Both parents were educated in Austrian Ukrainian schools and his father used his military pension to pay for Fediuk to attend a private Ukrainian school in his village and to attend gymnasium in Kolomea. Fediuk – who spoke fluent German – had pictures of the OUN leader Stepan Bandera, the interwar leader of the Ukrainian Military Organization Yevhen Konovalets, Ivan Franko, and Adolf Hitler on the walls of his apartment in Kolomea. He did his initial work for the OUN in Bukovina, on Romanian territory, far from his home or contacts. Later he was responsible for getting supplies across the Hungarian border.
All of the respondents on the Galician side of the Carpathians stressed the centrality of Ukrainian nationalist organizations in the villages. In each of the respondents’ villages, the Prosvita society had established a reading house that provided a cultural center to village life. The houses organized nationalist theater productions, had libraries of Ukrainian history, literature, and political propaganda. Choral groups would practice at the house. Often, the reading house was used by the Church as well and choral practices and readings were often organized by the local priest. (I was surprised to find that the centrality of these institutions had even been understated by the existing nationalist literature.) The range of participation clearly varied. Simchich noted that all of the “patriotic” families sent their children to the Prosvita groups and that the entire village attended the concerts and theatrical productions, but this clearly suggests that not all peasants were actively involved. Evdokia noted that her family would go to the reading house every evening, but this was clearly exceptional (and the house was only two doors down from their own). Nonetheless, between their schooling and the secondary education they received from Prosvita, all of the respondents were familiar with several different histories of Ukraine (not only Hrushevsky) and had read a considerably body of nationalist literature prior to the war. They claimed that their motivation for supporting the insurgents was the hope for the creation of an independent Ukraine.

It is noteworthy that those who did engage in killing – indeed even in mass killings of civilians – expressed no regrets about this and justified it as either the purification of the national territory or as the execution of traitors. For both Fediuk, who described his participation in the liquidation of a Polish village and recited with enthusiasm the OUN slogan that “our only diplomat is the avtomat (automatic weapon)”, and for Simchich, national goals justified the most extreme forms of violence and considerable sacrifice. In discussions of acts typically deemed cruel or immoral, both Fediuk and Simchich made reference to and justified their actions using the Decalogue, the ten commandments that each member of the OUN had to pledge. Although forms varied, the basic pledge is below:
1. Attain a Ukrainian State or die in battle for It.
2. Do not allow anyone to defame the glory or the honor of Your Nation.
3. Remember the Great Days of our efforts.
4. Be proud of the fact that you an heir of the struggle for the glory of Volodymyr’s Trident.
5. Avenge the death of Great Knights.
6. Do not speak of the cause with whomever possible, but only with whomever necessary.
7. Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it.
8. Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and perfidy.
9. Neither requests, nor threats, nor torture, nor death can compel You to betray a secret.
10. Aspire to expand the strength, riches and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.

(Motyl 1980, 42).

Nationalist motives may also explain, in large part, the significant hardships borne by the UPA combatants. One’s chances for survival were considerably reduced by one’s participation in the UPA. For UPA combatants, winters were typically spent motionless in tomb-like underground bunkers. Many suffered from gangrene and festering wounds. The levels of individual sacrifice were considerable. To amuse themselves, they sang nationalist songs, discussed political questions, and aspects of Ukrainian history. The movement is simply inconceivable without understanding their nationalism. It is hard to imagine what other purpose the combatants were enduring such hardships for if it were not for the ideal of Ukrainian statehood.

The resistance to occupation, be it German or Soviet, was expressed as patriotic resistance against alien invasion. The armed groups who resisted Soviet occupation explicitly espoused nationalist ideologies. They articulated independent statehood as a primary goal and were often formed by pre-existing underground nationalist movements. The soldiers wore national symbols and often drew their noms de guerre from national myths or important national historical figures. They sang nationalist songs, published nationalist pamphlets and propaganda, often received instruction in national history, literature and culture in the bunkers and encampments, and referred to the occupiers as racially or nationally alien.

40 Author’s interview with Miroslav Simchich, October 28, 2003
41 Author’s interview with Miroslav Simchich, October 28, 2003.
Organization of the Units

The UPA in Stanislaviv province was established by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its initial members were all members of the OUN. The OUN continued to play a central role in the command structure in the insurgency, but broadened the movement to include non-organization members (de-conspiratorized) Stanislaviv in order to build up strength to fight the Soviets and to prevent nationally-minded Ukrainian youth from being drawn into the Ukrainian SS unit where they would be at the disposal of the Germans. At this point, which took place prior to the arrival of Soviet troops (but in response to the efforts of Soviet partisans to take up positions in the Carpathians behind German lines), the UPA became an impersonal, mass army. Combatants were not carefully selected or vetted and were not part of pre-existing underground network. This is important, insofar as the continued effectiveness of the UPA shows that the cohesion of its units did not depend on personal ties, but on the impersonal bonds between strangers in a cause that are characteristic of ideological movements. In this way, nationalism played a critical role in the organization of the armed force in a way similar to that described by Posen in his discussion of the Levee en masse (Posen 1993).

Another clear marker of the impersonalism of the UPA is the widespread use of pseudonyms to protect identities. It was common that members of one’s own unit would not know who a person was or where they were from. In the event of capture or denunciation, this insured that one’s family could be protected. The pseudonyms were often taken from historical figures of significance to the national movement. Simchich, for example, was known as “Krivonis” after Maksim Krivonis, a Cossack leader who joined the 17th century Ukrainian hero Bogdan Khmelnitsky in his rebellion against the Poles (in which tens of thousands of Poles and Jews were massacred).

Relations with villagers

This nationalism was shared by the villagers, and both villagers and UPA officers reported that relations between the insurgents and the Ukrainian peasant populations were very close prior to 1946. Simchich, the commander of an UPA battalion that comprised
16 UPA companies that operated in Kolomia District of Stanislaviv oblast, reported that unless NKVD or other Soviet troops were garrisoned in a village, they moved freely there. When his units came out of their mountain camps, they were constantly on the move to avoid unplanned engagements with NKVD units. But they would simply arrive after dark at a village with which they had no prior agreements and to which they had no personal ties. The villagers would willingly take them in, feed them, let them spend the night, and the UPA units would leave just before dawn. Indeed, out of the war stories related by these two commanders, this version of the standard protocol of UPA interactions with villagers was borne out repeatedly. The UPA certainly had organizational networks – since the UPA often traveled at night in unfamiliar terrain, they needed an underground network of guides, messengers and informants to avoid detection – but these networks were neither personal nor particularly constraining.\textsuperscript{42} Both Simchich and Fediuk noted that they simply bedded down and were fed wherever it was strategically convenient. It was rare (although welcome) if they had personal contacts in the villages. This basic impersonal protocol was confirmed in the stories told by the villagers who were not combatants.\textsuperscript{43} Many spoke of UPA soldiers simply arriving at their houses in the evening and spending the night – indeed if respondents had been imprisoned, beaten, or tortured by the NKVD this was typically the offense for which they had been detained. None of the respondents I interviewed who had been detained for providing aid to the insurgents had actually known the person for whom they had been imprisoned personally. Both Simchich and Fediuk rarely saw their home villages and their activities took them to areas quite distant from their personal networks of family and friends.

The widespread popular support for the insurgents meant that the Soviets required extraordinary measures to repress it. Between January and April of 1946, the Soviets conducted what UPA soldiers refer to as the “Great Blockade”, in which the UPA incurred considerable losses. This was also a period in which, in February of 1946, elections to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were held.\textsuperscript{44} Soviet counterinsurgency units

\textsuperscript{42} “Evdokia” was one of the guides for her village and also relayed messages between regional commanders.

\textsuperscript{43} Author’s Interviews with “Evdokia”, “Maria of Chernelitsy”, Dmitry Klepai, Maria Daniliuk.

\textsuperscript{44} In Drogobich oblast, the UPA threatened to kill all who participated in the elections.
were garrisoned in all Carpathian towns and swept through the forests. As a result, the size of the UPA “Hoverla” force that covered Stanislaviv oblast decreased to 60% of what it had been and most of its experienced commanders were killed (Litopys UPA 1990, 18, p 22). Yet even as the NKVD began to build a stronger network of informants in the villages and began to garrison troops in the mountains, villagers continued to provide aid to the insurgents and the Soviets could not induce the mountain villagers to participate in the elections.

Ultimately, the Soviet counterinsurgency was able to make use of the vulnerabilities associated with the insurgency’s impersonal ties and trust among strangers to undermine the movement. The NKVD set up special training camps to produce agents skilled in the local dialect and customs and began to create false UPA units (Burds 1994). These units would travel about pretending to seek refuge and then arrest or burn those villages that provided aid. It was only at this point that the anonymous, impersonal, network of support broke down. Because the movement relied on an assumed bond among strangers, the Soviets were able to destroy it from within. After the relations with the village populations grew bloodier – with the UPA killing KGB informants (of which the interviewees had no regrets or qualms) – the UPA began to lose popular support for continuing a painful insurgency that appeared to be in vain. In 1947 most of its members demobilized and returned to the conspiratorial underground organization with a triadic cellular structure that characterized the OUN in interwar Poland.

**Transcarpathia: An Aversion to Ukrainian Nationalist Insurgents**

The contrast with the respondents in the neighboring Rakhiv region in Transcarpathia could not have been starker. In Transcarpathia there were no indigenous UPA units and thus no combatants to interview. In the area around Rakhiv where I conducted field interviews, one respondent who, prior to the onset of the Second World War had attended a special Ukrainian boarding school in Khust with a member of the OUN, noted that there were only two underground triads in the Rakhiv area.\(^{45}\) All three members in each of the triads were school teachers and both triads were uncovered by the NKVD – one in 1946 and the other in 1947. These underground triads had simply

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\(^{45}\) Rakhiv 3.
provided information to the UPA, occasionally assisted UPA forces across the border in supply, and had distributed UPA propaganda. The attitudes of the members of the local population towards the UPA were distinctly hostile. One respondent noted with pride that “the OUN-UPA idea was not accepted in our Rakhivsky region” and that “people did not understand what they wanted”. The insurgents were seen as alien and threatening and were referred to in the same terminology used by the Soviets “bandits” or “Banderovtsy” (after the OUN leaders Stepan Bandera).\(^{46}\) Both were derogatory terms. A respondent from the village of Bohdan, on the outskirts of Rakhiv, noted that 8 people in his village were killed in Bandera “raids” and that they came across the border to kill those who would not support them.\(^{47}\) The respondent’s father’s sister’s husband (his Uncle) was simply killed in the mountains by UPA forces. Several respondents expressed their confusion or alienation from the UPA, noting that they “came from over the other side of the mountains” where people were viewed as pathologically nationalistic. As put by one villager, “in the mountains we judge people by how hard they work” and that the highlanders [in Transcarpathia] are “internationalists first and only then nationalists”.\(^{48}\) All of the respondents drew sharp distinctions between the nationalist mentality of those in Galicia and those in Transcarpathia.

There was also a markedly different reaction to the arrival of Soviet forces. One respondent spoke of the “great happiness” (bolshaia radost) when Soviet forces arrived, that “this small part of the nation reconnected after 1000 years with the homeland (rodina)” – by which he meant Kievan Rus.\(^{49}\)

**Conclusions**

What does this comparison of two provinces in the Carpathian mountains during the 1940s tell us about why some communities take up arms to resist foreign occupation while others submit?

First, it suggests that the degree and content of nationalist sentiments in a population do have a significant effect on their propensity to resist occupation. The

\(^{46}\) Lugi 1; Bohdan 1.
\(^{47}\) Bohdan 1
\(^{48}\) Lugi 1.
\(^{49}\) Lugi 1.
divergent outcomes in two provinces virtually identical to one another—with the same low, forested mountains, Ukrainian-speaking population, Greek Catholic religious faith and agrarian way of life, and dense village networks—suggests that the cultivation of nationalism through the initial round of mass schooling has a long-term and independent impact on the propensity of a region to resist foreign occupation. What differed between Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv was not the material conditions or selective incentives to engage in armed conflict, but appears to have been the “stories of peoplehood” (Smith 2004) that led the population of Galicia to view the Soviets as alien occupiers and the peasants of Transcarpathia to view them as welcome liberators.

The consequences of this variation in local culture were quite striking. In Stanislaviv, tens of thousands were killed, deported, and imprisoned because of their willingness to engage in the risky and ultimately futile acts of sacrifice to resist Soviet rule. Even after the defeat of the insurgency, the population of Stanislaviv continued to engage in underground resistance and had one of the highest rates of dissident arrests in Soviet Ukraine in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1991, the province voted overwhelmingly to secede from the USSR. Soviet rule was never accepted as legitimate by the majority of the population.

In Transcarpathia, by contrast, the peasantry integrated relatively rapidly and peacefully into Soviet life. Respondents in that refer to the Pioneers or the Komsomol as “patriotic” organizations and continue to mark Soviet holidays and heroes, while deriding the “fanatical” nationalism of their co-ethnics on the other side of the hills. In keeping with this sentiment, a majority of the population voted to preserve the USSR when given a choice in the referendum of March 1991.

Second, while the dense structure of social ties within these communities clearly played a role in the capacity of the societies to resist, both the formation of those networks and the nature of their effects appears to have depended on the prior cultivation of nationalism through schooling. In contrast to claims that nationalism is an ex post rationalization of insurgent action motivated by personal bonds, we find that the personal bonds are largely a function of prior nationalist views and ties. Moreover, the insurgency itself relied on strong impersonal bonds—the community of loyal strangers—in order to
survive. This was true both for the relations between the combatants and for their relations with the local populations who sustained and aided them.

Though we must be careful in drawing general lessons from such a narrow comparison, the narrowness of the comparison has also made it possible to measure critical variables that are omitted from conventional analyses and also to examine more directly the causal links between the nationalist ideas and the motivations of the insurgents. The findings here suggest that nationalism plays a significant role and that the organizational networks may flow out of prior ideological attachments. Apparent “network effects” may reflect underlying differences in attributes of populations that have eluded measurement. Nationalism may vary systematically across provinces in other cases in ways that are measurable and which also contribute to our understanding of the factors that lead actors to resist occupation.
Appendix A:

How Ceteris became Paribus: A brief summary of the 1000 years of history that structured the natural experiment

How close these provinces come to controlled, experimental conditions needs to be assessed and justified, for despite the commonality in language, religion, and economic practice, Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia do not have an identical political history. Due to the strategic importance of the Carpathian mountains as a defensible boundary, the two slopes of the mountains have fallen under the control of different empires and states for long stretches of time. Because this boundary – and the argument that it is significant only for differentiating the content of schooling in each province – is so central to the natural experiment, let us now examine its history to identify whether it might correlate with any factors that have had a subsequent influence on the development of the insurgency. Specifically, I wish to identify any differences in the political or social history of each side of the Carpathians and to assess whether these have had an impact on the national identification or potential loyalties of the peasantry or on their propensity to be involved in the armed uprising against the Soviets in the wake of World War II. The long temporal scope also provides us with a better sense of the sources of the commonality in the antecedent conditions.

The Formation of a Common Rusyn Peasantry in the Carpathian Lands

Let us start with language and religion, attributes that the two provinces have held in common for over a millennium. The language commonalities of the two regions stem from the initial Slavic migration into the territory in the 6th and then a much larger migration in the 8th Century AD. In the 9th Century, the populations of both territories were converted to Christianity through the missions of Cyril and Methodius, although the manner and precise timing of the conversion are contested, particularly with regard to Transcarpathia. As Kievan Rus fragmented through wars of succession, the Orthodox Slavs on the western (southern) slopes of the Carpathian mountains (the future Transcarpathia) came under the control of the Kingdom of Hungary in the latter half of the 11th Century. The Magyar nobility introduced serfdom to the region. Hungarian
control was interrupted by Mongol invasions in 1240 and 1242 – which reportedly killed approximately one third of the population. The Western slope of the Carpathians then came under nominal Ottoman suzerainty when the Hungarian kingdom disappeared in the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, but Transylvanian Magyar nobles and Christian religious institutions retained considerable autonomy under the Ottomans. Transcarpathia remained nominally under Ottoman control until military victories of the Habsburg Empire gradually brought the formerly Hungarian crownlands under the control of Vienna during the mid-1600s, ultimately culminating with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699.

With the collapse of Kievan Rus through internal fighting and Mongol invasions, the future province of Stanislaviv and the territories to the East (North) of the Carpathians initially came under the jurisdiction of a new Slavic principality centered in the town of Galych – and hence were called Galicia [Galychyna]. Following several defeats at the hands of the same Mongol armies that devastated Hungary in the 13th Century, the principality of Galicia-Volhynia was significantly weakened. The area was conquered by Polish nobles under King Casimir the Great in 1349 and the East Slavic population was enserfed incrementally over the next five centuries. The territory remained under Polish control until the partition of Poland led to the annexation of Galicia by the Habsburg Empire in 1772.

While aspects of the early history are contested, it is clear that in both territories, an East Slavic speaking, Eastern Orthodox peasantry was initially subject to a Roman Catholic nobility – Hungarians to the West of the Carpathians, Poles to the East – and then converted to the Uniate or Greek Catholic faith. With the Treaty of Brest in 1596, the Orthodox churches under Polish territory came under Papal authority and control through the formation of the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church. The East Slavic liturgy of these churches was preserved and they retained their orthodox rite, but the episcopal appointments were subject to approval by Rome, the churches were fiscally beholden to Rome, and they adopted the Roman Catholic system of taxation. In the waning years of Ottoman rule, the Hungarian Catholics forced the Uniate model on the East Slavic Orthodox churches in the Eastern Carpathians with the Union of Uzhgorod in 1646.
By the late 18th Century, both territories were under the sovereign authority of the Habsburg Empire.

Despite the differences in the nobility, the two regions shared some basic commonalities and these historical shifts and differences in suzerainty of the two regions appear to have had an impact only on the identities and myths of the nobility in these two regions. The distinct religious and cultural life of the nobility and town dwellers had minimal effect on the peasantry of these regions due to the extremely limited extent of cross-cultural exchange between groups of different social status. The peasants of both provinces were illiterate. Despite several centuries of cohabitation and administrative subordination, the peasants still spoke a different language from the nobility, merchants, and townspeople. They attended different religious institutions. In short, there was no evidence of mutual cultural influence and no settings in which common socialization might take place.

Although the Carpathian mountains demarcated differences in the nobility, they did not mark or correlate with any differences in the peasantry. The Carpathian divide was relevant only to the elites concerned with the boundaries of their administrative and tax jurisdictions and to the increasingly nationalist nobles interested in restoring their previous domains. On a popular level, the peasantry of the region as a whole remained loosely tied through trade and through their membership in the Greek Catholic Church. The significance of the boundary lay only on the fact that it meant that the nobility on the Eastern side of the Carpathians was Magyar and on the Western side Polish. But the fact that the nobility was Magyar-speaking or Polish-speaking appears to have had no impact on the identifications of the peasantry prior to 1867.

Reports from the region during the Habsburg period suggest that the peasants on both sides of the Carpathians did not identify with one another, but each referred to themselves in similar ways. All evidence points to the fact that the East Slavic peasants at this time identified primarily with their local village, identifying themselves as zdesnye, mestnye, or tuteishi – meaning literally “people from here”, or with their faith, identifying as rusyn, ruski, russkij, rusnak, meaning “people of Rus””. As articulated by Magocsi:
“If a person from the Presov Region were asked his identity, he would respond that he was ‘from here’, from a particular village or county, or that he was a Rusnak, the local term for a Rusyn. Rusnak proved to be a deceivedly complex name, however, because historically it had come to designate all adherents of Greek Catholicism who, despite the ethnic origins of their ancestors, might by the 19th century be Slovak or Magyar as well as Rusyn. The situation was further confused when Rusnak/Rusyn came to be interpreted as an ethnolinguistic category, not a religious one. The realization of this semantic change came slowly among the masses, and when Hungarian census takers began to record the national composition of the region, it was not uncommon to find the inhabitants of the same village described as Slovak in one census and as Rusyn in the next.”(Magocsi 1993, 55)

According to some accounts, the terms “Rus” and “Orthodox” had been interchangeable in the region for centuries (and Polish/Magyar and the Roman Catholic rite were often equated). Hence, the terms “Rus” and Polish/Magyar probably marked religious rather than ethnic distinctions and there was effectively no concept of ethnicity or “blood” ties beyond one’s immediate kin (Vakar 1956, 12). The Austrians, who had more of a linguistic than a religious notion of ethnicity, referred to the East Slavic speaking populations under their domain as ruthenisch or “Ruthenian”, but this more modern “ethnic” only reached the local elites of the region in the mid-19th Century. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the populations as rusyns.

Towards the middle of the 19th Century, nationalism began to spread among the non-German elites of the Habsburg Empire, and in the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s both sides of the Carpathians were subject to similar political changes as Polish and Hungarian elites began to push for independence. In 1846, the Polish gentry in Galicia staged an abortive uprising calling for secession from the Habsburg Empire and the reconstitution

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50 For a similar assessment of the issue on the Galician side of the Carpathians, see Himka 1999, p. 8-12. It is noteworthy that Tsarist census-takers faced a similar problem and identified people’s nationality solely on the basis of their native language. Asking them to report their “nationality” would most likely have meant nothing to them. On the pre-collectivized peasantry, see Fitzpatrick 1994, 19-45. Also Vakar, 1956, 12.
of the Polish state. In 1848, the Hungarians briefly established an independent state under the liberal nationalist government of Lajos Kossuth before Russian Imperial troops marched in to suppress them at Vienna’s request in 1849. Although both movements were successfully put down, the authorities in Vienna recognized the threat such national movements posed and immediately set out to undermine them by mobilizing minority populations (Croats, Romanians, Slovaks, etc.) under the areas controlled by Polish and Hungarian nobility. It was a traditional Habsburg strategy of divide and rule.

The Rusyn populations under Habsburg control were a target of these efforts and the Austrian authorities initiated a “ruthenian (rusyn) revival” in the territories sought by Polish and Hungarian nationalists (Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia, respectively). In Galicia, a new Austrian-appointed governor, Franz Stadion, formed a new rusyn “national” organization, whose leadership was the upper echelon of the Greek Catholic Church. The new organization demanded equality with the Poles in Galicia and the creation of a new Rusyn province out of the 2.5 million predominantly East Slavic-speaking peasants of Eastern Galicia. It had no popular base, but membership of the Greek Catholic clergy was essentially compulsory. The Habsburg monarchy also curbed Polish nationalists and encouraged the revival of the Ruthenian Catholic Church (Uniate) which brought with it schools, a university, and the formation of a clerical intelligentsia (Yurkevich 1986, 67). Immediately following the Polish rebellion in 1846, the Austrian government created and funded the first rusyn national organization and the first rusyn-language newspaper.

On the Western side of the Carpathians, the Austrian government created a new Uzhgorod civil district (covering the Hungarian Uz, Bereg, Ugoca and Marmaros counties that would ultimately constitute the province of Transcarpathia) and appointed Adolf Dobrianskii as its deputy administrator. Dobrianskii was a rusyn from Presov (Slovakia) who had served as the Austrian Liaison to the Russian Army as it crushed the Hungarian uprising. Prior to this posting, Dobrianskii initially gained the attention of the

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51 The Polish uprising was put down with the support of Polish-speaking peasants in the Western parts of Galicia who proved eminently willing to slaughter their “co-national” landlords when offered a bounty by the Habsburgs – reflecting the dearth of national loyalties among even the Polish peasantry.

52 According to Himka, in 1848 the Uniate Church had 1600 parishes in Galicia and 2.15 million faithful. Given that Ukrainians were only 40% of the total population of Galicia, which according to the census in 1886 was just less than six million, this would mean almost universal Ukrainian membership. (Himka 1988, 36).
Emperor Franz Josef when he led a delegation of Rusyns from Hungary in 1848 to ask for union with the rusyns across the Carpathians in the Galicia. Once in office, Dobrjanskii appointed rusyn officials, changed the signs from Hungarian into rusyn and pushed for greater rusyn autonomy. The new district lasted only until March of 1850, but Austrian funding for Rusyn organizations in Hungary continued through the 1860s (Magocsi 1993 ‘The Rusyns,’ 40).

In keeping with the Habsburg’s close alliance with the Romanov empire, the story promulgated among rusyns on both sides of the Carpathians by the Greek Catholic clergy was what Magocsi calls Russophilism: the idea that the rusyns were part of the Great Russian people stemming from their common origins in Kievan Rus, and that they had been favored by Austria but mercilessly oppressed by the Hungarians and the Poles. Austrian and Russian-funded publications defending the rights of rusyns against Poles and Hungarians were put out in a language close to standard literary Russian. Virtually all of these publications were written by Greek Catholic clergymen whose appointment was controlled from Rome.

The creation of this rusyn-identified “national” elite out of the Greek Catholic clergy was important to Vienna’s effort to undermine the claims of Polish and Hungarian nationalist, but the impact of these elite trends on the mass of the peasantry appears to have been insignificant. The Habsburgs emancipated the serfs throughout the Empire in April of 1848, which increased if only marginally, the autonomy of the peasantry, but the population remained unschooled, so the content of the publications was largely inconsequential to the vast majority of the inhabitants on either side of the Carpathians.

Hence, at this point the Carpathian divide still did not demarcate any differences between the Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv peasantries: A russified or rusynified elite closely tied to the Greek Catholic church hierarchy had emerged in both provinces.
Appendix B: Questioning of the Respondents

My questions for the respondents centered on the following areas:

1. Their current identity/loyalty and its origins: Ukrainian, rusyn, etc.
   a. Languages spoken
   b. Did they remember when they acquired this identity?
   c. What was the identity of their Parents?
   d. How did they acquire their political loyalty?

2. Their childhood.
   a. Where and when they were born.
   b. What did the inside of their house look like (did they recall any pictures, books, etc.).
   c. Were they members of any groups or organizations (Prosvita, Plast, Sokol, etc.)
   d. Did they attend church, which church?

3. Their village
   a. Did it have a reading hut? Did anyone use it?
   b. Did it have a national house?
   c. Did it have a school?
   d. Ask for general description of the village

4. Education and schooling (all generations)
   a. Full history of all schooling for the respondent. Including questions about curriculum, texts, etc.
   b. Were their parents literate or illiterate? How much schooling did the parents have? Which schools did they attend? Language of schooling

5. Insurgency
   a. Their involvement and why
   b. Family involvement
   c. Village involvement
d. Were there informants in the village? How identified? How dealt with?

e. If combatant
   i. How did you get involved?
   ii. Why did you get involved?
   iii. How were you trained?
   iv. Where did you get supplies?
   v. How did you choose villages for refuge (personal, impersonal)
   vi. Did you have a *nom de guerre*? How and why did you choose it?
   vii. Regrets, doubts, feelings.
Appendix C: Maps

Map 1: Contemporary Boundaries of Provinces of Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv

Transcarpathia (labeled Zakarpatska Oblast’) and Stanislaviv (regional capital renamed “Ivano-Frankivsk” by USSR) in Western Ukraine.
Map 2: Map of Stanislaviv and Transcarpathia with Former Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia shaded
Map 3: Insurgent Activity in Western Ukraine 1943-1952

Transcarpathia

Stanislaviv
Map 4: Insurgent Activity Across Soviet Territory 1943-1952
Table 1: Network Density in Galicia and Transcarpathia (1938)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population of Province</th>
<th>Members in branch cultural organizations</th>
<th>Membership in branch cultural organizations as a % of total population</th>
<th>Number of “Reading Rooms” (chitalna)</th>
<th>Population per reading room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transcarpathia</td>
<td>725000</td>
<td>36000</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1318.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>4707600</td>
<td>319450</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>3208</td>
<td>1467.456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Paired Comparison of Transcarpathia and Stanislaviv Provinces Prior to the Soviet Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transcarpathia</th>
<th>Stanislaviv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (1930)</strong></td>
<td>725,357</td>
<td>1,480,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrain</strong></td>
<td>Forested mountains, foothills and valleys with farming plots</td>
<td>Forested mountains, foothills and valleys with farming plots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Ethnic” attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% “Ukrainian”/“Rusyn”</td>
<td>69.0% Greek Catholic (Uniate)</td>
<td>73.7% Greek Catholic (Uniate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-status minority (former landed nobility)</td>
<td>Magyar (16.9%)</td>
<td>Polish (16.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF)</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization Index</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Density</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in dominant civic organizations (as percent of total population)</td>
<td>5.0% (est)</td>
<td>6.8% (est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per “reading room”</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>1467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years of prior Soviet control</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in Russian Empire (since 1400)</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Soviet Occupation</strong></td>
<td>October 1944</td>
<td>July 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constitutive Story</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National content of initial schooling</td>
<td>Russophile Rusyn/Ukrainian (1920-1939)</td>
<td>Anti-Russian, Anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalist (1870-1914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Soviet Insurgency</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>UPA: 1943-1952 (approx. 20,000 combatants)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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